

This document consists of 2 pages.
Number 1 of 4 copies, Series A

EUR/RA:RFessenden:cnc

SECRET

762a.5/4-1659

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

XR 711.5612

Memorandum of Conversation

762a.5612
039, 62a11

Date: April 16, 1959

Place: Room 5106 New State

Subject: German Defense Problems

Participants: German

Defense Minister Strauss
Maj. General Panitzki,
German Army
Col. Reppening, German Army

U.S.

Mr. W. M. Holaday, Special Assistant
for Guided Missiles
General Betts, Deputy Special Assistant
for Guided Missiles
General Thatcher, Chief of MAAG Germany
Mr. Al Waggoner, Executive Assistant,
Guided Missiles
Mr. Philip Barringer, OSD/ISA
Mr. Chauncey Rowe, OSD/ISA
Mr. Russell Fessenden, Deputy Director,
EUR/RA

3-4 5-6 7-8

Copies to: G - Mr. Murphy, EUR - Mr. Kohler, GER - (2), GEA - (2), RA - (2),
WE, BNA, EE, Defense - ISA - Mr. Barringer (2), Embassy Bonn (2),
USRO (2), Embassy Paris for Thurston 16-17 18 21 19-21 14-15

APR 24 1959

The meeting was largely taken up with a comprehensive briefing by General Betts of the U.S. missile program covering all major surface-to-air, air-to-air, and surface-to-surface missiles, both those now operational and those under development.

In the question period which followed, Mr. Strauss inquired about the availability of the Red-Eye and the Mauler short-range surface-to-air missiles. He explained that the German Government hopes to procure these missiles at the earliest possible date for financial reasons. The German Government is reluctant to invest now in conventional anti-aircraft guns at considerable expense, only to have to replace them shortly afterward when the Red-Eye and Mauler are available.

Mr. Holaday replied that the Hawk is the best long-range, surface-to-air missile available. As for shorter range, conventional anti-aircraft guns are the only suitable weapon now, to be replaced later by the Mauler and Red-Eye when they become available. Mr. Holaday indicated that the development of the Mauler and Red-Eye could not be speeded up.

Mr. Strauss said that the Germans are now proceeding with the coordinated NATO Hawk production program. He inquired whether the Hawk was adaptable for Navy use.

General Betts replied that shipboard use of the Hawk had been considered and rejected by the U.S. Navy two years ago because: (1) radar stabilization on shipboard is difficult, and (2) the large fins of the Hawk are difficult to adapt for shipboard use. Nevertheless, it might be feasible to overcome

Copy No(s) 19, 20 + 21

SECRET

Destroyed in RM/R

these

762a.5/4-1659

This Document must be returned
to the RM/R Central File

SECRET

- 2 -

these difficulties. Mr. Rowe pointed out that a possible Navy adaptation of the Hawk had been presented to the NATO Working Group on Coordinated Production. Mr. Waggoner suggested that the U.S. Navy study in which the Naval adaptation of the Hawk had been studied and rejected should be made available to the German authorities. It was agreed that this would be done.

Mr. Strauss raised the "dead zone" problem in the Hawk missile. Mr. Waggoner indicated that the Raytheon Company is convinced that this problem can be dealt with.

The Germans asked whether the Hawk was adaptable for surface-to-surface use. General Betts replied that this was not possible.

Mr. Strauss inquired whether a land version of the Polaris surface-to-surface missile was under development. Mr. Holaday replied that no such development of the Polaris was planned and that we have left it up to the NATO IRBM Working Group in Paris to work out possible proposals in this field.

SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVE,